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 Hurricanes and tropical storms cause much harm and extensive damage. Their 
effect on crime is interesting as their precise timing is unpredictable. Yet, there is a 
limited body of research on this effect. This thesis examines the effect of hurricanes on 
burglary in North Carolina counties for a five year period between January 1999 and 
December 2003. It considers both routine activity theory and social disorganization 
theory to explain how crime may change after a disaster. The results indicate that some 
social disorganization components interact with a hurricane to produce an effect on 
burglary. The routine activity proxies used were not significant, but this could have been 
the result of numerous limitations. Future directions for research include improving and 
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Researchers have occasionally studied whether special events, such as holidays, 
have an effect on patterns of criminal offending (Cohn and Rotten, 2003; Zimring, 
Ceretti, and Broli, 1996). However, very few have investigated patterns of offending 
surrounding a relatively unexpected event. One such type of event is a weather disaster. 
A weather disaster is a natural meteorological phenomenon that causes physical 
destruction and social disruption. The government is primarily responsible for 
maintaining social control and alleviating the many problems that a disaster brings with 
it. Unfortunately, policymakers have little empirical research from which to draw upon 
when forming policy for such an event. This can cause them to rely on myths and 
anecdotal information. 
Two commonly held beliefs are that mass panic and looting occur in the wake of 
a disaster. According to Dynes and Tierney (1994), the mass panic phenomenon has been 
proven to be inaccurate. Looting, however, is more complicated. While narrowly defined 
as theft, it connotes a crowd of people wildly stealing from abandoned businesses and 
residences. Using the standardized definition of burglary, “the unlawful entry of a 
structure to commit a felony or theft” (Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/offenses_reported/property_crime/burglary.html, 
accessed on June 13, 2007) looting would be a post-disaster surge in burglary. 
To further complicate policy formation, research indicates that media portrayals 
of crime problems following a disaster are inaccurate (Drabek, 1986; Wenger and 
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Friedman, 1986). This effect is likely heightened by a scarcity of empirical evidence 
regarding crime in the wake of a disaster. This leads one to question what exactly 
disaster-crime policy is based upon. Drabek (1986:47) notes that “the greater the degree 
that disaster plans reflect myths about social behavioral responses, the greater the 
likelihood they will be ineffective.” Ineffective policies can lead to a waste of resources 
and distract attention from more urgent concerns. The goal of this thesis is to help 
eliminate myths surrounding the effect of weather disasters on burglary through empirical 
analysis. I specifically consider the relationship between burglary and hurricanes/tropical 
storms (here forward referred to as “hurricanes”) in North Carolina counties over a 60 
month period to answer the question: what is the effect of a hurricane on burglary?1 In the 
first section, I discuss weather disasters and responses. In sections II and III, I incorporate 
criminological theory into weather disaster response. In section IV, I discuss the data and 
method. The results and discussion of the analysis are covered in sections V and VI, 
respectively. Section VII discusses the limitations of this study and Section VIII contains 
the implications and conclusion.  
                                                 
1  Hurricanes and Tropical Storms differ in terms of wind speed. Hurricanes have sustained winds 
of greater than 73 miles per hour. Tropical storms have sustained winds of 39-73 miles per hour 
(http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/basics.shtml). Upon reviewing the events in the proposed thesis I 
found that most tropical storms resulted in or from hurricanes and were sufficiently destructive. The term 
“hurricane” will be used to generically capture all of these events unless a specific event is being discussed. 
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II. Weather Disasters 
There is a wide body of literature concerning the social impact of disasters. What 
is known about the effects of disasters is that they have a severe psychological impact on 
individuals (Sowder, 1985). In this section I discuss the government response to 
hurricanes and how crime policy can be incorporated into that response. I then outline a 
few examples of disaster preparation efforts that could impact crime. I also discuss broad 
social effects of a disaster, and then consider the specific effects a disaster has on crime. I 
conclude with a summary of the implications for this proposed thesis.   
Government Policy and Hurricanes 
According to Schneider (1992), the government’s general response to weather 
disasters should have three objectives: (1) preparing areas for potential emergency 
situations; (2) providing immediate relief after a disaster strikes; and (3) helping 
individuals and communities recover from the effects of a disaster. If crime does in fact 
increase following a disaster, then its prevention should be a priority throughout these 
objectives. If, however, crime levels are not affected by a disaster more emphasis can be 
placed on providing other types of aid to disaster victims. In order for the government 
response to achieve these objectives it is important that each response be tailored to the 
specific type of the disaster as each disaster presents a unique situation.  
Perry (1985) developed a disaster classification scheme which combined the work 
of Barton (1970) and Anderson (1969). His five dimension scheme covers the scope of 
the impact of the disaster, the speed of onset, the duration of impact, the secondary 
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impact, and social preparedness. The scope of the impact refers to the size of the affected 
area. The speed of onset is the amount of time between when warning of the event is 
received and when the event begins. The duration of the impact is the length of time that 
the disaster persists. The secondary impact includes other effects of the disaster such as 
physical destruction, health risks, and environmental hazards. Social preparedness refers 
to the predictability of the disaster (Perry, 1985:18). 
Hurricanes present unique situations when classified with Perry’s (1985) 
typology. Hurricanes affect very large areas; the track of an entire storm system can 
range thousands of miles. Hurricanes are detected well in advance of their landfall 
providing ample warning time for reaction. During the time between the initial warning 
and the onset of the hurricane people can prepare for the deleterious conditions and act in 
ways to prevent loss. Hurricanes typically last for a few days, and can cause damage that 
takes weeks or even months to repair. Finally, hurricanes usually occur during “hurricane 
season” – the six month period between June and November (North Carolina Division of 
Emergency Management, http://www.nccrimecontrol.org/index2.cfm?a=000003,000010, 
accessed on June 13, 2007) – and generally only affect specific areas. In other words, 
people generally know where and when a hurricane may occur and may use this 
information to make preparations far in advance.  
Some preparation efforts, such as choosing not to vacation during hurricane 
season, stocking up on emergency items, and boarding up homes may affect crime after a 
hurricane occurs. Yet, it is questionable whether citizens consider their vulnerability to 
crime while preparing for a hurricane. It has become the responsibility of the government 
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to take the unique circumstances presented by each hurricane into consideration and 
prepare appropriately in order to minimize damage and loss.  
Disaster Preparation 
Disaster preparation includes a variety of actions aimed at reducing harm via 
actions prior to the onset of the disaster. I consider three specific factors that are 
administered by the government: warnings, mobilization of emergency relief, and 
evacuation protocol and procedure. I discuss these factors in order to describe a few of 
the major processes that go on prior to a disaster. I have not included these processes in 
the data analysis because there is no systematic documentation of the actions taken prior 
to each hurricane. I discuss the possible effects of the exclusion of these variables in the 
limitations section. 
Warnings 
It is important to include a discussion of warnings because they could have an 
effect on burglary. Both potential burglars and potential victims are able to receive 
warnings. Warnings can draw burglars to an area or make them shy away. Burglars may 
be drawn to an area if they believe that the danger is minimal and know that people have 
left their homes vacant. Conversely, they may heed the warning and also be concerned by 
the danger caused by the threat. Potential burglary victims may heed warnings and hastily 
leave their houses in an unsecured state. However, potential victims may be wrought with 
concern about damage to their homes and board up windows, making them more difficult 
to penetrate. While the potential effects of a warning are apparent on the surface, the 
process of warning response is complex and not easily predicted. 
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Fitzpatrick and Mileti (1994) describe ten aspects to warning dissemination that 
create different responses depending on how they are combined and carried out. They 
are: (1) the source of the message, (2) the consistency of the information, (3) the accuracy 
of the message, (4) the clarity or understandability of the message, (5) the level of 
certainty of the impending disaster conveyed by the message, (6) the completeness of the 
information, (7) the guidance provided by the message, (8) the frequency with which the 
message is relayed, (9) identification of the level of risk for specific locations, and (10) 
the method of message delivery.  
 In addition, warning response consists of a two step process. First, the individual 
evaluates the situation. This step consists of five stages. First, the person is first made 
aware of the warning. He or she must then understand and believe the warning. After this, 
he or she must evaluate the risk. In the fifth stage the individual chooses what to do and 
proceeds into the second step of the warning response – reaction. 
 People choose among two main courses of action: to remain in the area or to 
evacuate. The type of action they choose is affected by five factors (Fitzpatrick and 
Mileti, 1994). The first factor is environmental cues. Environmental cues are personal 
evaluations of the potential harm of a disaster based on the state of the environment at the 
time. Second is the social setting in which the warning is received. The third factor is 
social ties; these connections to others operate to push people to stay in an area or leave. 
Fourth, the receiver’s sociodemographic characteristics (such as age and sex) influence 
how the individual evaluates the warning. Finally, psychological factors (such as 
variation in mental capacity) affect reaction to warnings.  
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 These many factors can lead to many different variables that may impact 
burglary: whether an individual evacuates, when an individual evacuates, the amount of 
time spent inside the home if the individual remains, and the measures taken to protect a 
home. Again, the effect of not including the many aspects of a warning is discussed in the 
limitations section.    
Emergency Relief 
 Emergency relief efforts are important procedures that serve to return the 
community to normal functioning as quickly as possible. These efforts can also provide 
an opportunity to practice crime reduction, should crime be a disaster-related problem. 
There are two types of emergency relief: pre-disaster and post-disaster. Pre-disaster 
efforts are intended to lessen the overall physical and social impact of the disaster prior to 
its occurrence. Pre-disaster efforts consist of mobilization of the National Guard, 
preparation of shelter sites, and mobilization of volunteers, for example. Pre-disaster 
relief is likely to occur for a hurricane because of the substantial amount of warning 
received.  
Post-disaster relief serves to return the community to normal functioning as 
quickly as possible Post-disaster relief can encompass the aforementioned actions and 
also includes providing funds. Funds are allocated to repair public facilities, provide 
victims with subsidies, and support shelters. Provisions for post-disaster relief can be 
included in preparation efforts.  
Pre- and post-disaster efforts that draw numerous volunteers and emergency relief 
workers to the area may dissuade burglars from coming into the area for fear of being 
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detected. However, if burglars are aware that many have abandoned their houses for 
shelters, they may be encouraged to target the abandoned area. Finally, if post-disaster 
funds are used to acquire new goods, burglars may again be drawn to the area. Pre-
disaster and post-disaster efforts that may help reduce crime are citizen education on 
potential victimization and increased police presence.  
Evacuation 
 There are two types of evacuations: post-impact and pre-impact. Evacuations can 
be mandatory, voluntary, or recommended. The type of evacuation is determined by the 
expected or actual harm of the hurricane. Evacuations are either short- or long-term. 
Short-term evacuations are less socially disruptive. Long-term evacuations can produce 
severe social consequences (Perry et. al. 1981) and can lead to permanent vacancy (Smith 
and McCarty, 1996). Like warnings, evacuations are not simple processes and it is 
important to consider each decision point. 
Perry (1994) notes that six variables affect the decision to evacuate: confirmation 
that the warning is real, confirmation that the warning comes from a reliable source, 
information about the nature of the threat, the perception of the amount of danger posed 
by the threat, possession of an evacuation plan, whether all family members are 
accounted for. An additional variable, not mentioned by Perry, is the ability to evacuate. 
Evacuation may have an effect on burglary in an area. First, evacuations leave 
many homes unguarded. Those residing in affected areas are required to leave and 
eventually the police must leave the area to avoid danger as well. Police typically set up 
road blocks to prevent people from entering evacuated areas. However, police may also 
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be forced to evacuate, leaving the area unguarded. Second, the mass exodus of refugees is 
likely to have a social impact both in- and outside of the affected area. Inside the area, 
residents that ignore evacuation orders may form a social network that serves to protect 
property and ward off intruders. Outside of the affected area, shelters are set up. Shelter 
areas may experience increased burglary as a result of the social disruption caused by the 
influx of many evacuees.  
The extent to which people evacuate may depend on the composition of the 
affected area. Research indicates that minorities are more likely to have lower 
perceptions of threat and less likely to believe warnings (Perry and Mushkatel, 1984). As 
such they are less likely to evacuate (Perry and Mushkatel, 1984). This finding is 
bolstered by evidence that as people’s perception of danger increases, the probability that 
they will comply with an evacuation order increases (Drabek, 1986). Thus, 
predominantly minority neighborhoods may retain many of its residents during a disaster.  
Social Outcomes of a Disaster 
In general, research has found two competing outcomes of a disaster. Either chaos 
occurs in the form of panic, riots, mass exodus etc.; or there is increased community 
cohesion – people form an altruistic community with goals of reparation. These outcomes 
also vary in their duration. 
Increased Cohesion 
 Studies that report increased cohesion do not find that these effects persist over 
the long-term. Friesema and colleagues (1979) reviewed multiple weather disaster sites 
and found that, in general, cohesive communities did form briefly, but the immediate 
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changes following the disaster did not survive over the long-term. They also found a 
short-term decrease in divorce rates immediately following the disaster; however, within 
five months the rates returned to their previous levels.  
Drabek and colleagues (1975) analyzed Topeka, Kansas after a tornado. They 
found that disaster victims were happier in their marriage and had improved their 
immediate family interactions. But, interaction with extended family members decreased. 
Drabek and colleagues also found a decrease in divorce rates immediately following the 
disaster; however, that effect only lasted for a short period of time.  
Increased Chaos 
 In contrast to research that finds cohesion, studies that find negative outcomes 
note that these outcomes persist. Two studies found that there were permanent changes in 
the community following a disaster. Erikson (1994, 1976) found that community social 
disorganization is permanently affected after a disaster. Smith and McCarty (1996) found 
that 33 percent of the population permanently left the area after a disaster.  
In addition, Siegel and colleagues (1999) conducted a series of interviews with 
independent samples of residents in Los Angeles County for two years following the 
Northridge Earthquake in 1994. They found no increases in social disorganization or 
community cohesion. Rossi and colleagues (1983) also found no long-term demographic 
changes at the county level. In summary, there are conflicting results as to what occurs 
following a disaster and also in how long these outcomes persist. 
Crime Outcomes of a Disaster 
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The crime-related research following a disaster is no more conclusive than the 
research that considers general social outcomes. Siegel (1999) in the aforementioned 
study, found no change in crime. Lemieux (2004) looked at rates of crime during 
Quebec’s ice storm and found a significant rise in property crime. He attributed this to an 
increase in the opportunity to commit crime. 
Friesema and colleagues (1979) analyzed crime after a hurricane in Galveston, 
Texas and found that the number of assaults reported decreased for approximately four 
months after the disaster. They stated that this result could have occurred for two 
different reasons. First, increased ties to family could have prevented assaults from 
occurring. Alternately, they realized that the finding could be an artifact of the data. The 
police may have been unable to detect and properly record assaults because the disaster 
disrupted their activity. Friesema and colleagues also found that auto theft increased. This 
increase, however, persisted for more than six months. They explain that the disaster 
could have damaged vehicles, making them easier to steal. They do not formally test this 
assertion and do recognize that this is only one of many plausible scenarios.  
LeBeau (2002) looked at police calls for service following Hurricane Hugo in 
North Carolina. He found that the police calls for service drastically shifted to other times 
of the day and argued that it was a result of changed routine activities. He separated 
routine activities into two types: discretionary and obligatory. Discretionary activities 
were activities that people chose to engage in, like going to the movies. Obligatory 
activities were activities that people were generally obligated to do, like going to work or 
school. LeBeau stated that when the hurricane struck there was an anomalously high 
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amount of calls for service during the time when people would normally be involved in 
obligatory activities (e.g. on a weekday morning) and a decrease in the amount of calls 
during typical discretionary time when calls for service peak (e.g. throughout the 
weekend). LeBeau also analyzed the overall number of calls for service and found an 
increase in all categories at least two standard deviations above the daily mean on at least 
one occasion in the ten days following Hurricane Hugo. He concluded that Hurricane 
Hugo altered routine activities, patterns in calls for service, and the number of calls for 
service.  
 Cromwell and colleagues (1995) analyzed crime following Hurricane Andrew and 
also took a routine activity theory perspective. They found no change in the amount of 
reported crime. They observed that the community increased its self-reliance and 
individuals served as their own guardians. Cromwell believed that official crime statistics 
may be distorted because the entire police department had been destroyed and officers 
were not available (personal communication, November 2007).  
Implications  
 The government plays an important role in disaster response. I have demonstrated 
in this section that policies and procedures can have an impact on citizen action both 
before and after the disaster. Evacuation policies are probably the most important policies 
affecting burglary. First, evacuations leave many homes unguarded. Those residing in 
affected areas are required to leave and eventually, due to rising danger levels, the police 
must evacuate as well. Police typically set up road blocks to prevent people from entering 
evacuated areas. However, after they too have evacuated, anyone is able to access the 
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area. Second, the mass exodus of people is likely to have a social impact in affected areas 
as well as the areas to which victims flee. Inside the area, residents that ignore evacuation 
orders may form a social network that serves to protect property and ward off intruders. 
Outside of the affected area, shelters are set up. Shelter areas may experience increased 
burglary as a result of the social disruption caused by the influx of many evacuees.  
There are mixed results as to the type of social impact a disaster has upon the 
community. In addition, there are inconsistencies as to whether the effect is long- or 
short-term. Also, evacuation rates may differ according to the racial composition of an 
area. The mixed results may indicate that social processes vary across communities. 
Therefore, I consider two theories to assess the hurricane-burglary relationship. I begin 
with a discussion of routine activity theory in order to explain how crime could occur 
after a hurricane. Then I incorporate social disorganization theory to explain how the 
effect of a hurricane may differ across counties. 
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III. Routine Activities and Hurricanes 
 Routine activity theory was first proposed by Cohen and Felson (1979) in order to 
explain how crime rates increased after World War II. They theorized that there is always 
a pool of motivated offenders: people waiting for the “right” situation to commit a crime. 
The right situation has unguarded suitable targets. In this section I summarize routine 
activity theory and establish the ties between changing routine activities and burglary. I 
also discuss how routine activities can change after a hurricane.  
In addition, I tie routine activity theory into social disorganization theory in order 
to provide a more comprehensive explanation of criminal behavior. One of the primary 
difficulties with finding full support for routine activity theory is that all of its 
components are not tested. I discuss this and other weaknesses. Finally, I discuss the 
implications for this proposed thesis.  
Routine Activity Theory 
 Cohen and Felson (1979:593) state that routine activities are, “any recurrent and 
prevalent activities which provide for basic population and individualistic needs.” These 
include work, school, and other activities both in- and outside the home. They assert that 
three things are necessary for the commission of a crime: a motivated offender, a suitable 
target, and the lack of a capable guardian. On a macro-level, any gross changes in these 
elements will produce a change in crime rates. Cohen and Felson analyzed crime 
statistics from an approximately twenty-year period after World War II. They found that 
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burglary (among other crimes) had increased. They attributed this to a macro-level shift 
in how people spent their time and the increased portability of goods.  
During the post-World War II period more women went to work during the day, 
people got married later in life, and divorce rates increased. As a result, the number of 
homes left vacant during the daytime, the time when burglary occurs most often 
(Reppetto, 1974), increased. This gave burglars more unguarded targets as they prefer to 
avoid contact with victims/guardians (Shover, 1991).  
At the same time, the number of suitable targets increased because of changes in 
the nature of goods. Appliances and electronics became smaller and more valuable. They 
were more portable and easier to steal. Cohen and Felson (1979) empirically 
demonstrated that changes in targets and how guardians spend their time was related to 
increases in crime. 
Hurricanes and Routine Activity Theory  
A hurricane could affect all of the elements in routine activity theory. Motivated 
offenders may be drawn to an area if they are aware that homes will be abandoned 
(Decker et. al, 2007). Conversely, offenders may be forced from an area if the weather is 
too severe.   
Reppetto (1974) found that, in general, burglars were not especially skilled and 
often chose targets based on ease of access. A hurricane may damage homes in ways that 
make them more accessible, increasing the number of suitable targets. Alternatively, the 
number of suitable targets could decrease if people made efforts to protect their homes 
 
16 
from damage by, for example, boarding up windows. If the only reasonable access point 
is the door, certain rare skills, such as lock picking, may be necessary to enter.  
 Three types of capable guardians may be available during a hurricane. First, the 
police are formal capable guardians. During a hurricane they may be present in high 
numbers. They may, however, be forced to leave if the weather is too severe. Also, it is 
questionable whether police can guard against burglary as it often occurs inside a private 
residence. At a minimum, police have been trained to look for and recognize criminal 
behavior and they are available around the clock.  
Second, homeowners are also potential guardians. They may evacuate, leaving 
their home empty or, if they choose to stay, they may spend more time at home than they 
would under normal circumstances. Finally, community groups can form during a 
hurricane. These groups may engage in “neighborhood watch” activities and step in when 
police are unavailable. These groups may be better at policing burglary because they are 
likely more aware of the whereabouts of the homeowners. However, these groups are 
unable to perform in the same capacity as police; they are not likely to operate 24 hours 
per day and also do not have police training.  
Routine Activity and Social Disorganization 
Routine activity and social disorganization theory have been linked on the 
individual level. Researchers theorize that characteristics of social disorganization that 
are found in individuals can be combined with routine activities to alter individual 
predisposition to crime. Miethe and colleagues (1987) observed that routine activity 
patterns were correlated with demographic variables and both affected victimization for 
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property crimes. One component of social disorganization theory is lack of control of 
minors. This component was incorporated into routine activity theory by Osgood and 
Anderson (2004) who found that unsupervised juveniles who were involved in 
unstructured activity had both increased delinquency and increased victimization. Smith 
and colleagues (2000) also made an empirical connection between the two theories by 
interacting them in a statistical model. They found that the interactions were significant.  
Weaknesses of Routine Activity Theory 
 Meier and Miethe (1993: 485) identify a few weaknesses of routine activity 
theory. The first weakness, also present in many other criminological theories, is what 
they term “theoretical indeterminacy, or the ability of the same indicator to serve more 
than one theoretical master”. Proxies are often used which capture more than the 
construct they are attempting to measure. For example, population density, which is often 
used as a proxy for the number of offenders and targets, can also indicate levels of social 
control. This problem is related to the second problem of relying on secondary data. 
Meier and Miethe state that secondary data can be problematic when it is not collected 
with the sole intent of looking at routine activities. The variables in these datasets were 
not intended to measure constructs of routine activity theory and therefore may not be 
capturing the constructs. The third problem is that all relevant variables are often not 
included in research designs and statistical models. Researchers often only look at one or 
two of the elements of routine activity theory. When they exclude elements, they fall 




 Routine activity theory has been successfully applied to burglary, making its 
application in the present study appropriate. It has also been successfully applied in 
previous research on weather disasters and crime. In addition, the theorized changes that 
could occur in the three elements provide support for its use. The present study builds on 
previous routine activity research by adding a new proxy to measure a change in routine 
activity theory. This study does not, however, resolve some of the other weaknesses of 
routine activity theory. 
While routine activity theory may explain increases or decreases in burglary after 
a hurricane, it fails to explain the divergent outcomes of community cohesion and chaos 
and how these outcomes affect crime. The issue of “theoretical indeterminacy” can also 
be resolved by incorporating specific measures of related theories, like social 
disorganization theory. For these reasons, I next consider social disorganization theory 
and its potential effects on post-hurricane burglary rates. 
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IV. Social Disorganization Theory  
 Shaw and McKay (1942) developed social disorganization theory after tracing 
patterns of delinquency over 30 years in Chicago neighborhoods. They used a social 
ecology perspective and the idea of concentric zones developed by Park and Burgess 
(1924) to develop their theory. Shaw and McKay tracked delinquency by concentric zone 
and noticed that it remained relatively stable despite changing demographic 
characteristics of the neighborhood inhabitants. They concluded that the stable crime rate 
was an inherent property of the area itself. These areas were socially disorganized and 
social disorganization was an endemic property of the location that did not go away even 
if there was a change in the residency. Social disorganization consists of a breakdown in 
community institutions. Shaw and McKay were quite vague as to exactly how or through 
what process social disorganization contributed to delinquency. They were, however, 
very clear that actual social disorganization is something that cannot be quantified 
(1942). The social interactions in a neighborhood have to be qualitatively observed and 
evaluated.  
 Sampson (1987) and Kornhauser (1978) have since clarified how social 
disorganization affects crime. Social disorganization impedes the formation of social 
networks. Social networks serve to control crime; according to Sampson they provide a 
supervisory function. Hence, areas that are socially disorganized have few or limited 
social networks and higher crime. Social disorganization theory typically uses the 
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neighborhood or standard metropolitan statistical area as its unit of analysis. However, 
Osgood and Chambers (2000) have successfully applied the theory to counties.  
In order to facilitate empirical studies, researchers have developed quantifiable 
constructs. There are many variations of these constructs. Those most commonly used 
capture socioeconomic status, residential instability, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, 
urbanization, and “supervision” (Jacob, 2006). These constructs typically use some type 
of spatial measurement as a unit of analysis (i.e. a city block or a standard metropolitan 
statistical area). In general research has supported linking these constructs to social 
disorganization and crime. They are, however, not without their problems. 
Social Disorganization Constructs 
Socioeconomic Status 
Socioeconomic status consists of far more than monetary factors; however, 
measures typically include income or poverty. Lander (1954) produced very controversial 
evidence that indicators of socioeconomic status (e.g. average education, average rent) 
were not statistically significant predictors of delinquency. His research was highly 
criticized and was essentially discredited for multiple methodological reasons (see 
Chilton 1964; Bordua 1958-59; Rosen and Turner 1967). More recent studies have found 
support for socioeconomic status as a contributing factor to social disorganization and 
increased crime.  
 Land, McCall, and Cohen (1990) investigated inconsistent results across multiple 
studies testing social disorganization covariates. They considered studies that used census 
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data from 1950 thru 1980. They found that relative deprivation was consistently 
associated with homicide across the four decades.  
 Sampson and Groves (1989) also found that socioeconomic status was an 
explanatory factor in differential involvement in crime in Great Britain. They used self-
report surveys to assess both violent and non-violent crime and found correlations with 
the constructs for both types of crime. However, some of the differences in crime rates 
due to social disorganization were quite small. 
 Smith and Jarjoura (1988) studied the impact of social disorganization on 
burglary using victimization data. They found that socioeconomic status was not a 
significant factor in burglary when other social disorganization variables were included in 
the model.  
 Bursik and Grasmick (1993) found that economic factors significantly affected 
crime. They also concluded that contradictory findings regarding socioeconomic status 
may be the result of looking at measures that do not capture economic deprivation, which 
they claim to be the more relevant factor. They argue that economic deprivation is more 
sensitive to variation at the low end of the socioeconomic scale than other general 
measures of socioeconomic status.  
Residential Instability 
The stability of a neighborhood is often measured by the rates of in- and out-
migration or by average length of residency. Residential instability prevents neighbors 
from forming social networks, which in turn causes a loss of control. According to 
Kornhauser (1978), social networks suffer because residents fail to communicate with 
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one another. Communication is hampered by the short amount of time people stay in the 
neighborhood. Residents are unable to form strong lines of communication because they 
do not stay in the area long enough. Some residents are also aware that they will only be 
temporary residents and avoid commitment to the neighborhood.   
Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) found a significant positive effect of length of 
residence on informal network formation in Great Britain. Tittle and Paternoster (1988) 
also found that mobility has an indirect effect on crime; it lowers commitment to 
neighborhood morals and thus increases crime. Sampson and Groves (1989) also found 
that residential instability significantly inhibited informal social networks.  
Crutchfield and colleagues (1982) analyzed crime in the 65 largest standard 
metropolitan statistical areas. They found that residential mobility was significantly and 
positively related to violent and property crime; the effect was strongest for burglary. 
They concluded that social integration broke down in those areas (Crutchfield et al.: 475). 
Smith and Jarjoura (1988) also found that residential mobility significantly impacted 
burglary. 
South (1987) and Messner (1986) both found that in-migration was significantly 
and positively related to crime. South considered out-migration as well but found that the 
effect lost significance when in-migration was incorporated into the model.  
Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity  
Racial and ethnic heterogeneity is typically measured by the proportion of non-
whites living in an area. Racial and cultural differences cause distance between residents 
and impedes the creation of informal social networks. Language barriers also prevent 
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residents from communicating with one another in an efficient and productive manner. It 
can also be a basic inability to find commonalities among people of different cultures.   
Sampson and Groves (1989) found that ethnic heterogeneity hindered the 
formation of informal social networks in Great Britain. Markowitz and colleagues (2001) 
also used data from the British Crime Survey and found a significant positive relationship 
between ethnic heterogeneity and crime.  
One consistent problem with determining the effect of racial and ethnic 
heterogeneity on crime is its confluence with poverty. This issue has lead researchers to 
draw different conclusions on the function of these variables. For example, in his study of 
Chicago neighborhoods, Small (2007) found that poverty was confounded with racial 
composition. He concluded that in neighborhoods where minorities were the majority, 
poverty, not the predominantly minority population, was prohibiting the formation of 
informal social networks.  
Urbanization 
Shaw and McKay (1942) postulated that urban areas would have higher social 
disorganization and hence higher crime. Researchers have found that urbanization is a 
valid construct in social disorganization and crime. Hartnagel and Lee (1990) looked at 
Canadian cities with populations greater than 25,000 people. They found that larger cities 
have both higher property and violent crime rates. Markowitz and colleagues (2001) also 
found that urbanization was a significant factor in explaining crime in Great Britain.  
There has been some research questioning the uniqueness of social 
disorganization to urban areas. For example, Osgood and Chambers (2000) analyzed over 
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250 non-metropolitan counties and found social disorganization. They also found that 
social disorganization affected crime in those areas. Shannon (1998) looked at the small 
town of Racine, Wisconsin and found that it was socially disorganized as well. 
Control of Minors 
Control of minors is the final construct and is often measured by the number of 
single-parent households or by a ratio of adults to children. Shaw and McKay (1942) 
stated that the ability to control teenage peer groups was an important part of being 
socially organized. They failed, however, to specify how minors are to be controlled. As 
such this construct has been called many different names. For example, Jacob (2006) 
used the term “supervision”; Sampson (1987), “family disruption”; and Korbin (1991), 
“loss of trans-generational control.”  
Markowitz and colleagues’ (2001) and Jacob’s (2006) research supports family 
disruption as a positive significant factor in crime.  The legitimacy of this construct is  
rarely disputed because of the abundance of research in many fields indicating that 
children from single-parent households are at a higher risk of engaging in delinquent 
behavior (see for example Demuth and Brown, 2004; Thomas et al., 1996; Antecol and 
Bedard, 2007). 
Problems with Social Disorganization Theory 
Despite substantial support for social disorganization theory, it still has 
weaknesses. Bursik (1988) identified five problems with social disorganization theory. 
Some of these problems have implications for this proposed thesis. 
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Bursik (1988) first noted that criminology shifted from a macro to a micro level 
approach. Individual level characteristics were used to explain criminality, not 
environmental factors. This shift in emphasis indicates that social disorganization theory 
lacks the explanatory power in explaining crime that individual level theories do.  The 
shift however, does not mean that environmental explanations of criminal behavior have 
been discredited. Taking a macro-level perspective is still appropriate and still receives a 
significant amount of scholarly attention. 
Bursik (1988) also identified the assumption of stable ecological structures as a 
problem. Researchers often used demographic data to determine whether an area is 
socially disorganized. Unfortunately, demographic data that is gathered too infrequently 
to reflect changes in the population could be related to social disorganization. To combat 
this problem, researchers have used longitudinal data. In addition, Kubrin and Weitzer 
(2003) recommend using growth curve models to assess how neighborhoods vary in their 
level of social disorganization over time.  
Third, Bursik (1988) recognized problems with how crime and delinquency are 
measured. This is a persistent problem in official data. In order to be included in the 
Uniform Crime Reports a crime must first be reported to the police. The police must then 
corroborate the incident and properly record it. Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips (2002) 
identify attempts to deflate statistics by misclassifying crimes and manipulating data. 
This problem is not unique to social disorganization theory. All research that uses official 
data is subject to this flaw. However, the issue still persists.  
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According to social disorganization theory, crime is more prevalent in areas with 
high levels of social disorganization. Perhaps these areas are subject to more attention 
from the police and more stringent reporting by the police. Also, citizens in disorganized 
areas may be more likely to use the police as a means to solve problems because, by 
definition, they are unable to effectively do so themselves. Hence, higher rates of crime 
could in reality be an artifact of social disorganization. However, studies that compare 
official and unofficial data still find support for social disorganization theory (Sampson, 
1985; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Elliott et al., 1996; Gottfredson et al., 1991) 
Bursik (1988) identifies the difficulty in measuring social disorganization as a 
fourth problem. While many of the concepts have been quantified, researchers have not 
reached a consensus on how to operationalize some of them. Sampson and Groves (1989) 
point out that an important reason why measurement has been a problem is because there 
is a lack of usable data. Data from official sources are often ill-suited for the 
measurement of social disorganization and gathering data independently requires funds. 
This is most clear with the constructs of cross-generational control and socioeconomic 
status (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).  
Finally, Bursik (1988) finds fault in the normative assumption of social 
disorganization theory. The normative assumption states that a collective consensus must 
exist in order to solve problems. Bursik (1988:535) points to research by Rossi and 
colleagues (1974) and Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) that indicates that a reasonable 
assumption is that residents want a life-style free from the threat of serious crimes. In 
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other words, the community can have heterogeneous norms and values and still be crime 
free. 
Implications for the Present Study 
The literature supports social disorganization as a factor that influences crime. It 
operates by hindering the formation of informal social networks. As a result, 
communities are unable to informally control crime prone residents and crime increases. 
Research has been fairly consistent in finding support for the factors associated with 
social disorganization and their subsequent influence on crime.  
Social disorganization theory may help explain why there are different outcomes 
after a disaster. Communities that are socially disorganized are unable to maintain social 
control under normal circumstances. When a catastrophic event is introduced, social 
disorganization may compromise the small amounts of social control in those 
communities. Those who are of low socioeconomic status will be unable to vacate or 
properly protect their homes. The lack of communication formed by cultural divisions 
and shifting populations will likely dissuade people from relying on their neighbors 
during a time of crisis. Single mothers will be consumed with the responsibility of 
protecting their children and taking care of their homes, rendering them unable to help 
the community after a hurricane. As such, an altruistic community is unlikely to form and 
mass panic may result. This state of chaos could mean more opportunities to steal. 
Conversely, in a community with well-formed networks, neighbors may find it 
natural to rely on one another during a disaster. Most residents are financially able to 
repair damages as well as offer aid to their neighbors. Since the neighborhood is 
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ethnically homogenous there is an increased chance that residents share culture as well. 
Thus, during a hurricane, it is more likely that those involved will have similar priorities 
and concerns. Intact families are able to share the responsibilities of protecting the 
household and managing the children; they may even be able to help others due to their 
increased efficiency. It is easy to envision how, during a disaster, a socially organized 
community could pull together and discourage crime through increased social control. 
Hypotheses 
I have developed two hypotheses that apply routine activity theory and social 
disorganization theory to a hurricane. As the literature has established, hurricanes affect 
routine activities. I assert that the threat of being harmed is what causes people to change 
their patterns of behavior and that the more severe the weather disaster, the more people 
will alter their routine activities. To the extent that routine activities move away from 
their norm, crime will increase because of the new patterns create new opportunities and 
targets for crime. Hence, the first hypothesis is that the amount of damage caused by a 
hurricane is positively related to the rate of burglary. I expect that this relationship will 
be curvilinear with diminishing returns as the severity of the storm – as measured by the 
amount of damage – increases. This is likely to occur for two possible reasons. First, if a 
disaster causes billions of dollars worth of damage, it is likely that there will be few 
objects left to steal. Second, disasters with extreme amounts of damage are often very 
dangerous and force everyone, including would-be thieves, from the area.  
The second hypothesis attempts to address the issue of different post-disaster 
community responses and the effect that such responses may have on crime. In this study, 
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I assume that residents want a relatively crime-free environment. I also assume that the 
extent to which such an environment is achieved depends on the formation of informal 
social networks. This, in turn, requires some level of social organization. I argue that in 
locations with high social disorganization, post-hurricane rates of burglary will increase. 
The disaster introduces more chaos into the environment and, after the hurricane, 
residents that are typically unable to control crime experience a more pronounced level of 
crime. Thus, the second hypothesis is that: the interaction of social disorganization and a 
hurricane is positively related to the rate of burglary.   
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V. Data and Method 
This section provides an overview of the proposed data and methodology that will 
be used in the thesis. First, I describe the sources of the data and give a qualitative 
account of the hurricanes that are in the dataset. Next, I state the proposed model. I 
follow this with a description of the variables. Finally, I address pre-estimation issues.  
Description of the Data 
 The data from this thesis includes North Carolina’s 100 counties over a 60 month 
period between January 1999 and December 2003; totaling 6000 observations. I 
comprised the dataset from three sources. The crime data come from the Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR). Only crimes reported to and corroborated by the police are in the UCR. 
The UCR data is assembled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from police 
departments on an annual basis. The UCR includes information on burglaries as one of its 
index crimes. For this thesis, the number of burglaries has been summed across all of the 
reporting departments in each county for each month.2  
The data on social disorganization comes from the United States Census Bureau, 
which is responsible for conducting the Census.3 The Census is delivered in questionnaire 
form and is conducted decennially. It captures basic information on the entire population 
and also generates imputed data for an extended questionnaire. This extended 
                                                 
2  The County figures were calculated from the jurisdiction data and the Census population as 
opposed to using the UCR County Data because of the population and imputation problems with UCR 
county-level data identified by Maltz and Targonski (2002).  They noted that the population figures in the 
UCR county-level data were often incorrect and noted significant problems with the imputation procedures 
used by the FBI which have not yet been fully resolved.  
3  The exception to this is the number of non-white residents which was obtained from the North 
Carolina Office of State Budget and Management. 
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questionnaire contains more detailed information on income, education, and employment, 
for example. The census variables are assumed to be constant across all time periods. The 
problems with this restriction are discussed in the limitations section.  
Information on the control variables comes from North Carolina’s Office of State 
Budget and Management. This office estimates county populations by age and sex. A 
complete description of how the estimates are derived is included in the first Appendix. 
The hurricane data come from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), a federal body responsible for the National Weather Service 
and other ocean and weather related agencies. There were 5 hurricanes/tropical storms in 
North Carolina recorded by NOAA during the period of observation (see Table 1).4 
Figure 1 displays the path of the hurricanes included in the analysis. The eastern region of 
the state was primarily affected. The second Appendix contains color-coded maps of the 
specific counties affected by the storm. 
The first, Hurricane Dennis, made landfall on August 30, 1999. After a brief stay 
on land Dennis went out to sea and returned some days later (September 4, 1999) as a 
tropical storm. Reports state that no one was injured and that the biggest losses were to 
commercial crab fishermen (Pressley, 1999a). Some areas had washed out roads and 
                                                 
4  The North Carolina State Climate Office (NCSCO) provides different information on the number 
of storms that affected North Carolina during this time period. Their data states that nine hurricanes/tropical 
storms affected North Carolina and two made landfall between January 1999 and December 2003. Their 
information excludes the specific counties affected, narratives of the events, estimates of damage, or 
estimates of injury and death. Because this data was less comprehensive, the data from NOAA was used. 
The six additional events that are included in the NCSCO data set were all non-landfalling, category one 
hurricanes or lower, with winds no higher than 75 miles per hour. The NCSCO states that this type of storm 
typically causes minor damage to vegetation. The strongest storm was hurricane Kyle which was classified 
as a tropical depression – sustained surface winds of less than 39 miles per hour – for the majority of the 
time it passed over the eastern coast of North Carolina.  
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flood waters up to four feet deep (Fallis and Perlstein, 1999). In Carteret County, located 
on the coast, approximately 400 people went to shelters (Pressley, 1999a). 
Table 1. Distribution of Hurricanes over time in North Carolina 
Hurricane Name Month & Year Occurred  
Hurricane Dennis August 1999 
Hurricane Floyd September 1999 
Hurricane Irene October 1999 
Tropical Storm Gustav September 2002 
Hurricane Isabel September 2003 
 
Hurricane Floyd came shortly after on September 14, 1999. Hurricane Floyd was 
much more devastating than Dennis, with losses estimated at six billion dollars (Brooks, 
1999). Over one-half of the state was affected and the entire eastern third of the state was 
impassable (Firestone, 1999). A state of emergency was declared and coastal islands were 
evacuated (Pressley, 1999b). Over one-thousand people had to be rescued from the roofs 
of their homes after being forced there to escape flood waters (The Sun, 1999a). Thirty-
thousand people’s homes were flooded, and 10,000 people had to go to shelters (The Sun, 
1999b). One million people lost power (Fisher, 1999) and a few factories shut down 
(Matthews and Hagerty, 1999). Over one million livestock perished and there was an 
estimated 1 billion dollars in agriculture losses (Kilborn, 1999). A twelve hour curfew, 
between seven pm and seven am, was ordered in the city of Rocky Mount in order to 








 Just over a month later, on October 17, 1999, Hurricane Irene hit North Carolina. 
Fortunately it was not as destructive as Floyd had been. However, likely as a result of the 
devastation caused by Floyd, a state of emergency was declared and 300 National Guard 
troops were mobilized (New York Times, 1999). Flooding was the primary problem 
brought on by Irene, as the ground was already saturated from the floods caused by Floyd 
and Dennis (Nakamura, 1999)  
The next event, Tropical Storm Gustav, did not occur until September 2, 2002. 
Although it was only a tropical storm, it was the biggest storm in North Carolina since 
Dennis (New York Times, 2002). Gustav’s primary target was the Outer Banks (the 
eastern coastal counties of North Carolina) where areas were flooded (New York Times, 
2002).  Power was knocked out on Hatteras Island, located in Dare County’s southern 
Outer Banks (St. Petersburg Times, 2002).  
The final hurricane in the time period under consideration, Hurricane Isabel, made 
landfall on September 18, 2003. A state of emergency was declared and National Guard 
troops were mobilized (Leinwand and Parker, 2003). The Outer Banks were most 
affected. Three people were killed in the disaster (Fears, 2003). All of Hatteras Island, 
located in Dare County on the southern Outer Banks, was inaccessible due to flooding 
and washouts (Cooperman and Walsh, 2003). President Bush declared a federal disaster 
(Kennedy, 2003).   
Model 
I use a random effects panel model with maximum likelihood estimation to 
evaluate my hypotheses. The distribution of the dependent variable does indicate that a 
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Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) would also have been appropriate due to the truncation of the 
data at zero (see Figure 2). However, after comparing the results of the Tobit and the least 
squares panel models, the findings were similar and the least squares panel model was 
chosen for ease of interpretation. I have selected a random effect model in order to 
account for variation over time in omitted variables (Hsaio, 2003). I have no reason to 
assume that the variables that I am not capturing remain constant over time or across each 
county. By choosing a random effects model I allow variation in the error across both 
time and county (Hsaio, 2003). One caveat of a random effects model is that I assume 
that the errors have a normal distribution. To make sure that I was not erroneously 
choosing the random effects model, I conducted Hausman tests (1978). When significant, 
the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects model should be used, of all of the 
models indicated that using a random effects model was acceptable. The model is as 
follows: 
Burglary Rate = f(Hurricane, Financial Severity , Corporal Severity, Social   
Disorganization, Social Disorganization x Hurricane, Controls)                 (1) 
Where “social disorganization” and “controls” are comprised of multiple variables. The 






















Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of Burglary Rate 
 
Variables 
 The following variables have been selected for inclusion in the proposed model. 
Their descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 2.  
Burglary Rate  
Number of Burglaries per 10,000 households is the outcome variable. It takes the 
form: 
B=((bc / uc) x 10,000)                                                              (2) 
Where the number of burglaries in a given county, bc, is divided by the number of 
“housing units”, uc, in that county. Housing units, as opposed to population, is used in the 
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burglarized.5 The mean number of burglaries was 19.18 per 10,000 with a standard 
deviation of 12.20. 
Hurricane Measures 
 The first two measures of the capture the amount of damage, death, and injury 
caused by the hurricane and are proxies of the impact on routine activities. In theory, the 
more damage a hurricane causes, the more it alters routine activities. For example, if 
schools and offices are destroyed, people cannot engage in their routine of going there 
during the week. The first measure is financial severity. It is defined as: 
                                              F =  ((p + c)/lc ) / 1000                                                (3) 
Where p is the estimated amount of property damage in dollars, c is the estimated 
amount of crop damage in dollars, and lc is the total land area of the county in square 
miles. The figure is measured in thousands of dollars. The mean amount of damage is 
$7.9544 per square mile with a standard deviation of $85.2001. NOAA calculates the 
dollar estimate from “all available data at the time of publication” 
(http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/sd/sdfaq.html, accessed on May 3, 2007). This 
includes police, media, and private corporations. This measure does exclude water area.   
Corporal severity of the hurricane is another key independent variable. It 
indicated the number of deaths and injuries per 10,000 county residents. It is defined as: 
C =((i + d)/hc) x 10,000                                                            (4) 
                                                 
5  According to the US Census Bureau: A housing unit is a house, an apartment, a mobile home, a 
group of rooms, or a single room that is occupied (or if vacant, is intended for occupancy) as separate living 
quarters. Separate living quarters are those in which the occupants live and eat separately from any other 




Where i is the number of injuries caused by the hurricane, d is the number of deaths 
caused by the hurricane, and hc is the number of habitants in the county. The mean 
amount of deaths and injuries was 0.0208 per 10,000 habitants. The maximum was 
31.2876 per 10,000 habitants6. 
NOAA’s unit of analysis is the National Weather Service Forecast Zone. In North 
Carolina, each zone is a county. However, in the storm database some of the counties are 
grouped together under one event.7 For example, Brunswick, New Hanover, and Pender 
County are one grouping of counties for Hurricanes Dennis, Floyd, and Isabel. Therefore, 
the occurrence of a hurricane is a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating the occurrence 
of at least one hurricane in a given county during a given month. The hurricane is 
recorded by individual National Weather Service Forecast Offices and that information is 
then transferred to NOAA. The National Weather Service Forecast Offices determine 
whether or not a hurricane occurs in a county based on wind speed. In order for a county 
to be classified as having had a hurricane winds must reach a speed of 74 miles per hour. 
Approximately two-percent of the county-months had at least one hurricane (see Table 
3).  
                                                 
6  Corporal severity was not squared because the squared values became very small and were of 
little contribution to the analysis. 
7  See Appendix 2 for a complete guide of how the counties are grouped together. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables. 
Variable Name Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable     
Burglary Rate 19.1800 12.2000 0.0000 80.41 
Independent Variables     
Routine Activity     
Financial Severity 1.6606 18.8958 0.0000 435.7384 
Financial Severity^2 359.7495 5493.3700 0.0000 189868.0000 
Corporal Severity 0.0208 0.5707 0.0000 31.2876 
Hurricane 0.0183 0.1342 0.0000 1.0000 
Social Disorganization     
Proportion Urban 0.3487 0.2757 0.0000 0.9613 
Proportion Non-white 0.2455 0.1751 0.0109 0.6673 
Linguistic Isolation 0.0136 0.0098 0.0000 0.0554 
Born Outside US 0.0353 0.0240 0.0065 0.1125 
Female Headed Household 0.0695 0.0221 0.0270 0.1243 
Relative Deprivation 0.4171 0.0227 0.3733 0.4662 
Proportion Non-
professional employment 
0.7380 0.0558 0.5024 0.8095 
Average Education* 3.5330 0.4578 3.0027 6.0000 
In-migration 0.1889 0.0591 0.0986 0.3855 
Out-migration 0.1481 0.0476 0.0890 0.3831 
Control Variables     
Proportion Age 15 – 24 0.1319 0.0334 0.0857 0.3206 
Proportion Male 0.4905 0.0150 0.4581 0.5540 
Coastal County 0.2000 0.4000 0.0000 1.0000 




Table 3. Distribution of Hurricanes across County-months. 
Hurricane Frequency  Percent 
None 5890  98.17 
One or more 110 1.83 
Total 6000 100 
 
Social Disorganization Variables 
The social disorganization variables selected have been linked to their theoretical 
constructs. Table 4 shows which variables measure each specific construct. A description 
of the variables and how they are measured follows. 
Proportion of urban residents is the operationalization of urban, one of the 
components of social disorganization. It is defined by the following function: 
U = hu / hc                                                                  (5) 
where hu is the number of habitants classified as urban by the US Census. The average 
proportion of a county that was urban was 0.3487 with a standard deviation of 0.2757. 
 Proportion of nonwhite residents is one indicator of racial and ethnic 
heterogeneity. The formula is: 
W  = hnw / hc                                                               (6) 
where hnw is the number of residents classified as non-white in a county. This number 
includes Hispanics and multi-racial individuals.    
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 Linguistic isolation is the second indicator of racial and ethnic heterogeneity. It is 
defined as: 
 L = Hesl / Hc                                                               (7)  
where Hesl  is the number of households in a county where English is not spoken “very 
well” by all adults in the household, as determined by the US Census. And, Hc is the total 
number of households in the county. The average proportion of linguistically isolated 
households was 0.0136 with a standard deviation of 0.0098. 
Proportion of people born outside of the United States is the third indicator of 
racial and ethnic heterogeneity. It takes the form: 
N =hf / hc                                                                     (8) 
where hf  is the total number of foreign born residents in a county.
8 The average 
proportion of non-US natives in a county was 0.0353 with a standard deviation of 0.0240. 
Supervision of minors is operationalized by the proportion of female headed households. 
 It takes the following form: 
S = Hf / Hc                                                                                                      (9) 
where Hf  is the proportion of female headed, single parent households. The average 





                                                 
8  Foreign born does not include those born in Puerto Rico, US island areas, or born those born 
abroad to citizens of the United States. 
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Table 4. Social Disorganization Constructs and the Census Variables Assigned to 
the Construct. 
Construct Variables  
Urbanization   Proportion Urban  
Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity Proportion Nonwhite  
Total Linguistic Isolation  
Total Born Outside of the US  
Supervision of Minors Proportion Single Parent Female Headed 
Household  
Socioeconomic Status Relative Deprivation  
Proportion in Non-professional Occupation  
Average Educational Attainment for those over 
25*  
Residential Instability In-migration over 5 year period (1995-2000)  
Out-migration over 5 year period (1995-2000)  
* -- variable is reverse coded 
 
 Relative deprivation is one indicator of socioeconomic status. It is determined by 
the Gini coefficient, which is a measure of income inequality. Possible values range from 
zero to one with higher values indicating more income inequality. I use Abounoori and 




















1                                                              (10)        
where C= 2 / n(n + 1), n is the the number of individuals, K is the total number of groups, 
wk  is the weight corresponding to each group, y  is the mean income, and  ky  is the 
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mean income of a group. I apply this formula to the 2000 Census data on income. There 
are 16 different groups of income in this data, measured in dollars.9 I used the midpoint 
of the category multiplied by the frequency of the category in order to calculate group 
mean income.10 I compared the aggregate income using this formula to the aggregate 
income given by the Census and there was a small error that was never higher than 2 
percent. This error was consistently positive indicating that my estimates of income are 
slightly high. This may have had a slight impact on the accuracy of the figures. The 
fourth appendix contains the complete derivation of Abounoori and McCloughan’s 
equation. The average relative deprivation is 0.4171 with a standard deviation of 0.0227. 
 Another indicator of socioeconomic status is the proportion of people in a non-
professional occupation. It is defined as: 
eeP
p
/=                                                                        (11) 
where pe  is the number of people employed in a non-professional occupation and e is the 
total number of people employed. 11      

















                                                                 (12)            
                                                 
9  The 16 categories are as follows: less than 10,000; 10,000 to 14,900; 15,000 to 19,900, 20,000 to 
24,900, 25 to 29,900; 30,000 to 34,900; 35,000 to 39,900; 40,000 to 44,900; 45,000 to 49,900; 50,000 to 
59,000; 60,000 to 74,900; 75,000 to 99,900; 100,000 to 124,900; 125,000 to 149,900; 150,000 to 199,000; 
greater than 200,000.  
10  For the greater than $200,000 category, $200.000 was used. 
11  Refer to Appendix 5 for a complete listing of job categories. 
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where ng is the number of people in group g of educational attainment (g = 1,2,…,G). 
Educational attainment ranges from one nine (see Table 5 for a description of the 
categories). This variable is reverse coded so that higher values indicate less educational 
attainment. The mean average educational attainment is 3.533 with a standard deviation 
of 0.4578. 
Table 5. Educational Attainment Levels and Assigned Values. 
Level of Education Value 
No Education 9 
No High School 8 
Some High School 7 
High School Graduate 6 
Some College 5 
Associate’s Degree 4 






 In-migration is the first measure of residential mobility. It is calculated by: 
I = mi / hc                                                                 (13) 
where mi is the total number of people that moved into a county over a five year period 
between 1995 and 2000. The mean in-migration is .1889 with a standard deviation of 
0.0591.  
 Out-migration is the second measure of residential instability. The formula is as 
follows: 
O = mo / hc                                                                 (14) 
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where mo is the total number of people that moved into a county over a five year period 
between 1995 and 2000. The mean out-migration is 0.1481 with a standard deviation of 
0.0476. 
Control Variables 
 The following three control variables are included in the model: proportion aged 
15-24, proportion male, and coastal county. The first two, proportion aged 15-24 and 
proportion male, will be used to control for known correlates of crime. Including whether 
or not the county is coastal will control for any unique effect being in a coastal county 
will have on burglary. These could include the effects of: vacation homes, different 
weather patterns, and population flows. North Carolina has a total of 20 counties 
designated as coastal by NOAA.  
Pre-estimation Issue 
 All of the social disorganization variables for the data are more correlated with 
each other than with the dependent variable (see Table 6), a violation of the guideline 
established by Klein (1962). When the variables are highly correlated, it indicates that 
they are related. Models that suffer from multicollinearity have inflated standard errors 
which can possibly lead to a Type II error, in which a false null fails to reach 
significance. This problem is common in studies with variables measuring social 
disorganization theory and has been previously addressed by principal component 
analysis (see Land et al., 1990; De Coster et. al, 2006). I also conduct principal 
component analysis in order to address the multicollinearity issue.
 
 
Table 6. Correlation Matrix of Social Disorganization Variables. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Burglary Rate      (1) 1.0          
Proportion Urban (2) 0.4087 1.0         
Proportion Non-white  
(3) 
0.4732 0.0652 1.0        
Linguistic Isolation  (4) 0.2664 0.3381 -0.0219 1.0       
Born Outside US     (5) 0.2790 0.4517 -0.0196 0.9417 1.0      
Proportion Female 
Headed Household     (6) 
0.5928 0.2613 0.8294 -0.0021 -0.0190 1.0     
Relative deprivation   (7) 0.0814 -0.2885 0.4595 -0.1362 -0.2207 0.3831 1.0    
Proportion in Non-
professional 
Employment   (8) 
-0.0932 -0.5548 0.0708 -0.3693 -0.5417 0.0780 0.0860 1.0   
Average Education    (9) 0.0201 0.5306 -0.2271 0.2529 0.4112 -0.1886 -0.2861 -0.7285 1.0  
In-migration     (10) -0.0986 0.2222 -0.2186 0.0384 0.2265 -0.2222 -0.3249 -0.5710 0.5174 1.0 
Out-migration (11) 0.0104 0.3555 0.1035 0.0414 0.1881 0.0986 -0.0086 -0.4301 0.3845 0.6690 
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  I extracted 3 factors with Eigenvalues over one (see Table 7). Visual analysis of 
the scree plot also indicated that there were three possible factors (see Figure 3). The 
loadings on the factors shown in Table 8, the rotated loadings shown in Table 9, as well 
as the loading plot after rotation (see Figure 4). Both the orthogonal varimax and oblique 
rotation described three general components: disadvantage, non-national, and migration. 
Disadvantage was comprised of proportion nonwhite, female headed household, and 
relative deprivation. Non-national was a combination of linguistic isolation and born 
outside of the U.S. Migration consisted of both in-migration and out-migration. Notice 
that these variables are not linked to the components in the same manner they are linked 
to the theoretical constructs in Table 4. The components were created by summing across 
the relevant variables. 
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Table 8. Component Loadings from the Prinicpal Component Analysis of the Social 
Disorganization Variables. 
Variable Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 
Proportion Urban 0.3414 0.2268 0.0377 
Proportion Non-white -0.1175  0.5990 -0.0956 
Linguistic Isolation 0.2747 0.1521 0.5862 
Born Outside of US 0.3616 0.1494 0.4761 
Proportion Female 
Headed Household 
-0.0939 0.6085 -0.0737 
Relative Deprivation -0.1963 0.3567 -0.1400 
Proportion Non-
professional Employment 
-0.4391 -0.0902 0.0920 
Average Education -0.4595 0.0222 0.1752 
In-migration 0.3561 -0.1323 -0.3930 




Table 9. Orthogonal Varimax and Oblique Rotated Component Loadings of the Social Disorganization Variables. 
Orthogonal Varimax Rotation Oblique Rotation 
Variable 
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 
Proportion Urban 0.2755 0.2674 0.1483 0.3344 0.3889 0.1412 
Proportion Non-white -0.0020  0.0040 0.6179 -0.1056 0.0944 0.6695 
Linguistic Isolation -0.0931 0.6585 -0.0000 0.0077 0.6919 0.0907 
Born Outside of US 0.0402 0.6149 -0.0014 0.1520 0.6809 0.0604 
Proportion Female 
Headed Household 
0.0058 0.0366 0.6189 -0.0913 0.1322 0.6730 
Relative Deprivation -0.0586 -0.1324 0.4055 -0.1577 -0.1009 0.4344 
Proportion Non-
professional Employment 
-0.4197 -0.1814 -0.0184 -0.5053 -0.3158 0.0349 




Table 9 (continued)       
Orthogonal Varimax Rotation Oblique Rotation 
Variable 
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 
In-migration 0.5054 -0.1604 -0.1325 0.5693 -0.0551 -0.2520 

































Figure 4. Loading Plot of Social Disorganization Variables after Orthogonal 
Varimax Rotation 
  
The Cronbach’s alpha for Disadvantage was only 0.3720, which is relatively low. 
However, I found that the Eigenvalue of this component was 1.8986 after re-rerunning a 
factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation, indicating that these three variables 
together explain more than they would independently. The Cronbach’s alpha for 
migration was 0.7904 and 0.7942 for non-national. The three remaining variables 
(proportion non-professional, average education, and proportion urban) did not fit with 
any of the components and were retained as separate variables. The correlations of the 
social disorganization variables and components improved. However, average education 
 
 53 
and proportion non-professional were still highly correlated (see Table 10). I proceeded 
to conduct preliminary analysis in order to see what the effects of each of these variables 
were in the model. The results of this analysis are described in the next section. 
Table 10. Correlation Matrix of Social Disorganization Components and Remaining 
Social Disorganization Variables. 
Component/ Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Non-national (1) 1.0000     
Mobility (2) 0.1773 1.0000    
Disadvantage (3) -0.0410 -0.1014 1.0000   
Proportion  
Non-Professional (4)  
-0.4978 -0.5556 0.0783 1.0000  
Average Education (5)  0.3698 0.5010 -0.2457 -0.7285 1.0000 




 This section contains the results of the least squares panel regression models. 
There are two main analyses. The first group of models assesses the effect of the routine 
activity proxies on the rate of burglaries per households. The second assesses the impact 
of the social disorganization variables and their interaction with a hurricane on burglary. 
The results include the variance of the person-specific error, Sigma i, the variance of the 
general error, Sigma u, and the total variance contributed by the county level variance 
component, Rho. In addition, three types of fit statistics are included. First, the likelihood 
ratio test is the difference in the log-likelihood of the present model and, in this case, the 
constant only model. The statistic has a chi-square distribution with the degrees of 
freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters estimated. Second and third 
are the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Both of these statistics penalize for additional parameters. In both of these cases, the 
lowest value indicates the best model. .  
 The routine activity results (see Table 11) also include the constant only model 
which indicates that the average rate of burglary is approximately 19 per 10,000 
households. The routine activity proxies are not significant when added consecutively or 
concurrently. But, their direction indicates that increased financial impact increases 
burglary rate, financial impact squared decreases burglary rate and corporal harm 
decreases burglary rate. The magnitude of the results is fairly small, with each additional 
100,000 dollars of damage contributing very little to the rate of burglary. Each additional 
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death or injury per 10,000 people decreases the rate of burglary by less than one 
household per 10,000. The dichotomous coastal county variable was significant (p<.01), 
indicating that coastal counties had approximately five fewer burglaries per 10,000 
households than non-coastal counties. None of the models with the theoretically relevant 
variables are best fitted to the data according to the likelihood ratio test, AIC, and BIC. 
 Many iterations of the social disorganization models were tested. As previously 
noted, problems arose with the correlations of proportion non-national, mobility, 
proportion non-professional, average education and proportion urban as indicated by the 
increased standard errors. 
In order to determine which variables were most problematic I conducted collinearity 
diagnostics on the five variables above. Table 12 contains the results of this analysis. The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was highest for proportion non-professional and average 
education, but was not extreme. However, the tolerance for both of these variables is low, 
which is problematic as a tolerance of zero indicates multicollinearity. The figures for 
non-professional indicate that this variable is more problematic than average education. 
Yet, from a social disorganization theory perspective, removing this variable and 
retaining average education is not sensible. In areas where average education is low, 
residents may still able to support themselves financially and invest in the community as 
well. In areas with higher proportions of non-professional employment, the average 
income is likely to be lower. Residents in these areas may have a decent education, but 
may be unable to find employment that meets their qualifications. These people may be 
divested in the community and be simply looking to transition out of their employment 
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predicament and the community. Thus, retaining proportion of non-professional 
employment and dropping average education is more appropriate for assessing social 
disorganization. 
 After this issue was resolved, I added each social disorganization variable to the 
model with the dichotomous hurricane variable. The hurricane variable remained 
significant throughout all of the models and was positive, indicating that a hurricane 
increased the rate of burglary. The magnitude of this increase, however, was only 
approximately one additional burglary per 10,000 households. The non-national and 
disadvantage components and the proportion urban also remained significant. Proportion 
non-professional and mobility seemed to still present some multicollinearity issues. A 
consequence of multicollinearity is that standard errors are large and failure to reject the 
null hypothesis is more likely. The non-professional variable is significant in the final 
model, but the mobility variable is not. Both of these variables were retained for the next 
portion of the analysis.   
 
  
Table 11. Panel Analysis Results for Routine Activity Proxies on Burglary Rate (Standard Errors in Parentheses). 
Variable Model  1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 








Financial Severity 2   -6.73 x10-7  
(4.22x10-6) 
 -3.24 x10-6  
(4.81 x10-6) 
-3.42 x10-6  
(4.82 x10-6) 








     -3.2487 
(9.9870) 
Proportion Male      -18.1280 
(41.9551) 














Sigma i 10.5134 9.4374 9.1682 10.3593 8.9588 8.5920 
Sigma e 6.2786 6.2787 6.2792 6.2789 6.2792 6.2781 




Table 11 (continued)      
Variable Model  1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Loglikelihood -19792.6 -19792.27 -19791.75 -19792.36 -19791.07 -19788.26 
LR Test (df)  0.66 (1) 1.70 (2)  0.48 (1) 3.06 (3) 8.68 (6)  
AIC 39591.21 39592.53 39592.53 39592.73 39594.15 39594.51 
BIC 39611.31 39613.33 39613.33 39619.53 39634.34 39654.81 
* -- < .05 





Table 12. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), Tolerance, and R-squared of the 
Correlated Social Disorganization Components and Variables. 
Variable VIF Tolerance R-squared 
Non-national 1.42 0.7064 0.2936 
Mobility 1.52 0.6580 0.3420 
Proportion Non-
Professional 
2.90 0.3450 0.6550 
Average 
Education 
2.31 0.4328 0.5672 
Proportion Urban 1.59 0.6298 0.3702 
  
 Next, I incorporated the interaction between social disorganization and the 
hurricane. Table 13 contains selected model results. The only interaction variable that 
was significant was that of the hurricane interacted with mobility (p<.05). Further 
additions of variables to the model produced a worse fit. Thus the final and best fitting 
model contains only the hurricane-mobility interaction with the addition of the control 
variables. The hurricane-mobility interaction is negative, indicating that when a hurricane 
hits an area, the level of mobility in the area causes the rate of burglary to decrease. 
Specifically, a one unit increase in mobility causes burglary to decrease by approximately 
9 burglaries per 10,000 households. In these models, the hurricane variable alone came 
close, but failed to reach significance in all models. Disadvantage, proportion non-




Table 13. Selected Results from the Panel Model with Social Disorganization Variables Interacted with the Dichotomous 
Hurricane Variable (Standard Errors in Parentheses). 











































Table 13 (continued). 
Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Final Model 








Hurricane x Non-national   -5.7731 
(18.1110) 
 































Table 13 (continued) 
Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Final Model 
Proportion 15-24    -9.4459* 
(10.1344) 
Proportion Male    19.6810 
(42.5060) 










Sigma i 6.6969 6.6954 6.6951 6.4080 
Sigma e 6.2746 6.2743 6.2742 6.2732 
Rho 0.5325 0.5324 0.5324 0.5106 
Log-likelihood -19744.62 -19744.34 -19744.28 -19739.00 
Degrees of Freedom 12 13 14 15 
LR (df)  0.56 (1) 0.68 (2) 11.24 (3)** 
AIC 39513.24 39514.67 39516.57 39507.99 
BIC 39593.63 39601.77 39610.36 39608.48 
* -- < .05 





 Neither of the routine activity proxies that I identified were significant. Hence, my 
first hypothesis was not supported. The direction of the variable was correct for financial 
severity, but the magnitude was small. The direction for corporal severity was not as I 
had hypothesized. In fact, increased death and injury drastically decreased the number of 
burglaries. These proxies may not have been accurate enough to capture the effect (if 
any) on the rate of burglary. Conversely, there could be an issue with construct validity in 
that these proxies are not in fact measuring an effect on routine activities. This idea may 
be somewhat supported by the early tests of the social disorganization models where the 
dichotomous hurricane variable reached significance. However, as these models grew in 
complexity, the variable lost its significance.   
 My second hypothesis was onlysomewhat supported in once instance. One of the 
social disorganization variables, mobility, significantly interacted with a hurricane. 
However, the direction of effect of the hurricane-mobility interaction on burglary was not 
correctly hypothesized. This interaction indicated that more mobility during a hurricane 
resulted in lower rates of burglary. This is contradictory to social disorganization theory. 
I assert that what I have in fact captured with this result is not social disorganization 
decreasing crime, but that people in highly mobile areas move out following a disaster - 
thus leaving nothing to take nor anyone to do the taking. While the notion that residents 
permanently leave an area has been empirically supported (Smith and McCarty, 1996), 
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the remainder is pure speculation. This study contains no measures of permanent 
migration after a hurricane. However, in highly unstable areas, it seems likely that the 




 There are many limitations to the present study. First, routine activities were not 
directly measured. Also, like other studies using routine activity theory, only two 
components of the theory were actually captured: guardians and targets. While some of 
the factors affecting motivated offenders may be captured by the amount of destruction, 
there is no direct measure of how many potential thieves moved into an area following a 
hurricane. Obtaining this type of information is highly unlikely since a large portion of it 
is unofficial.  
In addition, the financial and injury/death information was compounded across 
many counties. This certainly deteriorated some of the accuracy in the effect of the two 
proxies on burglary. The potential problem is, for example, that the majority of damage 
occurred in one county, but the estimate was pooled across three counties. This would 
cause the other two counties to be attributed with more damage than actually occurred. If 
burglary rates did not change in these counties, or went in the opposite direction of the 
county where the most damage occurred, the relationship between this figure and 
burglary would be obscured. Perhaps a county specific measure of financial and corporal 
severity would have resulted in a significant relationship with the rate of burglary.  
 The second major limitation of this study is the measures of the social 
disorganization constructs. While annual data was used where possible, it was not used 
on many of the important variables like annual income. ESRI, a private corporation that 
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provides geographic information system and mapping software, does provide an annual 
book of interpolated county demographic figures for each state. However, upon 
investigating this as a potential resource for this study, it was determined that their unique 
data was unusable. Their population demographic information was acceptable, but had 
already been obtained from North Carolina’s State Office of Budget and Management. 
They offered annual interpolations on income but only provided five different categories 
of income. The limited amount of categories did not allow for an accurate calculation of 
relative deprivation.  
 The potential problem with having used data collected decennially is that it could 
be insignificant in predicting crime. Since this data remained stable while crime 
fluctuated, it would appear that it had no effect on crime. In the present study, this did not 
prove to be a problem in terms of the significance. However, it is likely that the 
estimators are not accurate. 
 Another limitation of this study is the lack of information on disaster responses. 
As previously mentioned, evacuations, warnings and disaster relief all have the potential 
to affect burglary rates. However, there is no information on evacuations and warnings 
that is regularly recorded or gathered by one body. This is complicated by the fact that 
any jurisdiction can issue a warning, ranging from one village to the entire state, and 
these can be done simultaneously. Another problem with measuring evacuation orders is 
that some counties may refuse to issue them under any circumstances. For example, 
Onslow (a sparsely populated coastal county), never issues evacuation orders. This is 
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because the responsibility for the well-being of the citizens then falls upon the county. 
Onslow does not want this liability. The county may recommend that citizens evacuate, 
but never issue an official order.  It is unknown whether other counties follow this same 
policy.   
 Another restriction is the reliance on official data. This problem is especially 
important for the present study because police may be unable to respond to citizens 
during and after a hurricane. Should there be increased rates of burglary during that time 
they would not be reflected in official data. In addition, official data is also dependent on 
citizens being aware of their victimization. Residents may never know if they have been 
burglarized if there are large amounts of damage.  It is also possible that a burglary may 
not be evident for some time. Even then, should a homeowner recognize that a burglary 
has occurred it is impossible to say whether or not they would report it. The problem of 
non-reporting may be further exacerbated by insurance. If an individual can simply 
compound stolen items into insurance claims of disaster loss, it is unlikely that they 
would go through the hassle of contacting the police as well. 
These limitations are extensive and do serve to weaken the results. However, they 
do not compromise the findings entirely. Despite these limitations, this study still has 
important implications which are discussed in the final section. 
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IX. Implications and Conclusion 
 The most important finding in this study is that the effect of a hurricane on 
burglary is dependent on social components. This implies that policies should be tailored 
to the needs of the specific area in order to effectively impact burglaries following a 
hurricane. One blanket policy will not be sufficient. In areas where additional burglary 
prevention measures are needed, a more conservative policy would not be effective. In 
areas that are socially organized, a more comprehensive policy would be wasteful.  
The other main implication of this research is that more data needs to be collected 
on disasters, important disaster related demographic factors, and variables that measure 
social disorganization and routine activity theory. Disaster research would be greatly 
improved if there were official records on all of the aspects of a disaster. This includes -
but is not limited to - whether a warning was issued, whether a curfew was issued, the 
amount of damage caused, and the amount of money put into disaster relief and the 
source of those funds. In addition, estimates of damage that are gathered in a more 
systematic fashion would be desirable.  
The abandonment of areas following a hurricane should also be recorded. It has 
only been assumed in this study that people permanently vacating an area caused the rate 
of burglary to decline. This hypothesis should be formally tested, but to do so requires 
appropriate data. This again, leads to the major limitation of this study, the lack of 
regularly collected data. The state of North Carolina does do an impressive job estimating 
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some figures on an annual basis, but there are a number of important factors that are not 
regularly measured. While private groups, such as ESRI, do gather some of this 
information, they do not provide the finite data that is needed to thoroughly address the 
complex issue of social disorganization.  
There are also many areas for future research. First, the routine activity proxy is 
worthy of future research. The proxy used in the present study should be re-evaluated 
with better data and new proxies should be tested. Police calls for service, as used by 
LeBeau (2002) may be helpful in determining the impact on routine activities. Second, a 
re-test of the models in this study using data that has been collected more regularly is 
important. The results contained in this study must be replicated prior to any policy 
formation. Third, a different theoretical framework could be used. For example, rational 
choice theory may be more appropriate in explaining how individuals choose to commit 
or not commit a burglary following a disaster. In theory, an individual may weigh the 
potential of getting caught in a city that has been abandoned and a typical non-offender 
may choose to steal. In an alternate scenario, burglary may be a rational choice if the only 
other choice is to go hungry. Fourth, multiple sources of crime data should be explored. 
This would be helpful for determining the nature of discrepancies between official and 
unofficial data during a disaster. In addition, it would provide direction as to the type of 
data that should be used in future analysis. Finally, this idea could be expanded to other 
crimes and other types of disasters. As stated in the second section, each type of disaster 
can be analyzed using Perry’s (1985) typology. This means that different factors occur 
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for each type of disaster. A closer study of the effects that various types of disaster have 
is important for the creation of disaster specific responses. In addition, the type of crime 
is important to consider as well. One type of crime prevention policy will not target all 
types of crime, thus policies need to be crime specific and should be research based.   
Hurricanes have a detrimental effect on many things. While this study has many 
limitations it provides insight as to how a hurricane affects burglary. It helps to explain 
past mixed results on whether an altruistic community forms or social disorganization 
occurs following a hurricane. It shows that the effect of a hurricane is dependent upon the 
nature of the community prior to the disaster. Society does not drastically change because 
an unexpected factor is introduced. While mobility, an otherwise negative factor, may act 
in a way to decrease crime after the disaster, the “bad” area does not suddenly become 
“good” as a consequence of the tragedy. Future research using improved data and 
methods is necessary in order to formulate comprehensive policy.    
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Appendix 1. Method for Estimating County Totals. 
Note: This is the method used for 2003. The methods for previous years are the same, 
with the obvious exception that the corresponding census estimate is used.  The 
description below has been reproduced from:   
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm/facts_and_figures/socioeconomic_data/population_
estimates/demog/revmet3.html 




Revised July 1, 2003 County Population Estimates 
Methodology --- County Totals 
For these estimates, the county boundaries are those in effect for the 2000 federal census, 
including changes released by the Census Bureau through the middle of March of 2007. 
The state estimate was produced by adjusting the 2003 state estimate for North Carolina 
released in March of 2007 by the United States Bureau of the Census for changes in 
major institutional populations at both July 1, 2003 and April 1, 2000. The county 
estimates are averages of two sets of estimates, a set of modified Census Bureau 
estimates, and a set of alternative estimates produced by this office. 
Modified Census Bureau Estimates 
In March of 2007, the Population Division of the United States Bureau of the Census 
released their revised 2003 state and county population estimates for North Carolina. 
They used an administrative records technique similar to the 1990's technique of the same 
name. I made a few corrections to their April 1, 2000 county institutional populations and 





Two basic procedures were used to build these estimates. First, I estimated the population 
65 years of age and older. In the past, changes in the number of MEDICARE enrollees 
during the estimate period were used to measure changes in the population 65 years of 
age and older. This year, because of problems getting consistent MEDICARE data for 
years after 2003, I just used the 65+ population from the modified Census Bureau 
estimates mentioned above. 
Second, I used a standard ratio/correlation method to estimate the population aged 0-64. 
The data series used were automobile and truck registrations (X1), school enrollment in 
grades 1 through 8 (X2), and a three year sum of births (X3). For 2003, the three year 
sum of births was the sum of final calendar year values for 2001, 2002, and 2003; for 
2000, the sum of final calendar year values for 1998, 1999, and 2000. The prediction 
equation for each North Carolina county is given by 
y = -0.00391 + 0.52214 * X1 + 0.27868 * X2 + 0.19735 * X3, 
where y represents the estimated ratio of percentage shares of nongroup quarters 
population and each of the series indicators (X1, X2, and X3) represents the ratio of 
percentage shares of the associated variable. The equation coefficients were derived by 
least squares regression, using series indicator and population values for 1990 and 2000. 
The results of this equation were adjusted for the extra 1/4 year of the estimate period by 
linearly expanding the change in y from the assumed 2000 value of 1.0. The nongroup 
quarters 0-64 population estimate derived from this equation was combined with 
independent estimates of the population of military barracks, college dormitories, and 
other institutions to yield the estimate of the total 0-64 population. 
The state estimate for 2003 was the adjusted one mentioned above. Subtraction of the 
sum of the county populations 65 and older from this estimate produced a control for the 
0-64 population estimates. 
Methodology --- Age, Race, and Sex Detail 
To calculate the populations for the different age, race, and sex groups, I used a relatively 
simple process. First, projections were made for each county by 384 age, race, and sex 
cells (96 age values: 0,1,2,...,94, and 95+; white/other; male/female) to April 1, 2010. 
Then, these values were interpolated (age cohort interpolation for non-institutional 
populations; age group interpolation for institutional populations) to July 1, 2003 using 
the April 1, 2000 Census values as a base. Next, the 384 cells for each county were 
proportionately adjusted to sum to the county total population. Finally, the appropriate 
age cells were summed to form each group.  
 
 
Appendix 2. Storm Specific Maps of Affected Counties. 






















Hurricane Isabel (September 2003) 
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Appendix 3. County Groupings for Hurricanes. 
Group 1 Events 
Bertie, Camden, Chowan, Currituck, 
Pasquotank, Perquimans 
Hurricane Dennis, Hurricane Floyd, 
Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Isabel 
  
Group 2  
Beaufort, Carteret, Craven, Duplin, Dare, 
Hyde, Greene, Jones, Lenior, Martin, Onslow, 
Pamlico, Pitt, Tyrell, Washington 
Hurricane Dennis, Hurricane Floyd, 
Hurricane Isabel 
  
Group 3 Event 
Brunswick, New Hanover, Pender Hurricane Dennis, Hurricane Floyd 
  
Group 4  Event 
Alamance, Anson, Chatham, Cumberland, 
Davidson, Durham, Edgecombe, Forsyth, 
Franklin, Granville, Guilford, Halifax, 
Harnett, Hoke, Johnston, Lee, Montgomery, 
Moore, Nash, Orange, Person, Randolph, 
Richmond, Sampson, Scotland, Stanly, Vance, 
Wake, Warren, Wayne, Wilson 
Hurricane Dennis, Hurricane Floyd 
  
Group 5  Event 
Carteret, Dare, Hyde Tropical Storm Gustav 
  
Group 6  Event 
Gates, Hertford, Northampton Hurricane Isabel 
  
Group 7  Event 
Caswell, Rockingham, Stokes Hurricane Isabel 
  
Group 8 Event 
Cumberland, Durham, Edgecombe, Franklin, 
Granville, Halifax, Nash, Person, Vance, 




Appendix 4. Abounoori & McCloughan’s (2003) Gini Coefficient  
 
 This appendix provides an extended description of Abounoori and McCloghan’s 
(2003) derivation of the Gini Coefficient. For their complete article see the 2003, 8th issue 
of Applied Economics Letters. 




)(21 zlG d z                                                                (1) 
where z is the proportion of people receiving a certain income and l is the proportion of 
total income received by those people. Essentially, it produces a figure indicating 
disparity between proportion of the population and proportion of income earned.  
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where n is the number of individuals and y is income. This derivation cannot be used with 
grouped data which is missing information on individual incomes. Hence, Abounoori and 
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Appendix 5. Occupational Categories 
 
Management, professional, and related occupations: 
  Management, business, and financial operations occupations:  
    Management occupations, except farmers and farm managers 
    Farmers and farm managers  
    Business and financial operations occupations:  
      Business operations specialists  
      Financial specialists  
  Professional and related occupations:  
    Computer and mathematical occupations  
    Architecture and engineering occupations:  
      Architects, surveyors, cartographers, and engineers  
      Drafters, engineering, and mapping technicians  
    Life, physical, and social science occupations  
    Community and social services occupations  
    Legal occupations   
    Education, training, and library occupations  
    Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations  
    Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations:  
      
Health diagnosing and treating practitioners and technical 
occupations  
      Health technologists and technicians  
Service occupations:  
  Healthcare support occupations   
  Protective service occupations:   
    
Fire fighting, prevention, and law enforcement workers, including 
supervisors  
    Other protective service workers, including supervisors  
  Food preparation and serving related occupations  
  Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations  
  Personal care and service occupations  
Sales and office occupations:  
  Sales and related occupations   
  Office and administrative support occupations  
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations  
Construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations:  
  Construction and extraction occupations:  
 
 80 
    Supervisors, construction and extraction workers  
    Construction trades workers  
    Extraction workers   
  Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations  
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations:  
  Production occupations   
  Transportation and material moving occupations:  
    Supervisors, transportation and material moving workers  
    Aircraft and traffic control occupations  
    Motor vehicle operators  
    Rail, water and other transportation occupations  
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